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INTRODUCTION 
Ideas can be arduous to devise but are often relatively easy to 
reproduce once discovered and are hard—if not impossible—to “take 
back” once they have been shared. This raises problems of 
nonappropriability when it comes to the economic returns tied to 
ideas, resulting in the classic problem of underprovision, which is 
well known when it comes to public goods.1 Who will spend the time 
and effort and keep the open mind that allows for the discovery or 
creation of the next great idea when any Tom, Dick, or Harry can 
come by and reap the rewards tied to it?  
In many a textbook, one reads that patents are the legal 
construct that transforms intellectual property, in the form of such 
commercially valuable ideas, into private goods—much akin to real 
                                                 
 * Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Social 
Sciences, Michigan State University. This Article is based on my comments at the 
Michigan State Law Review Symposium Public Domain(s): Law, Generating 
Knowledge, and Furthering Innovation in the Information Economy, East Lansing, 
Michigan, October 2014. I wish to thank Adam Candeub for extensive discussion 
concerning the topic at hand and the Michigan State University Law Review editors, 
in particular Matthew Piccolo and William J. Cox, for very thorough and helpful 
editorial assistance. 
 1. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 126 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
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property—endowing the owner with the rights associated with such 
property, in particular the right to transfer the property to others and 
the right to exclude others from trespass upon the property.2 Having 
thus overcome the problems of nonappropriability, it is argued that 
the mechanisms that safeguard the incentives to generate the efficient 
span of ideas are put in place and are secured.3 
My main objective in this Article is not to debunk an at-best 
tenuous analogy tying the legal construct of patents to how we treat 
real property. However, there are two shortcomings in particular with 
this analogy that are worth spending some time on; namely, the 
abstract nature of what a patent ought to embody in contrast to the 
real nature of land and the fundamental resource constraint that is 
tied to land that is not present in the realm of ideas.4 Understanding 
these differences then serves as a guide to some of the current 
economic concerns in patent policy and practice. 
Thus, my argument is that a good guide to understanding many 
of the issues tied to codifying intellectual property in the context of 
patents is to focus on how patents are not and cannot be analogous to 
real property. In light of this, I draw out some of the experiences we 
currently are making in patent policy, practice, and law, and I 
conclude by noting that much of the focus on patents qua property 
may be missing the recognition that the patent system and its 
application also govern the transaction costs associated with the 
market for ideas, and this is critical to the proper functioning of the 
system. 
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 123. The analogy is likely tied to Kitch’s view of patents 
being a prospect system, in addition to a rewards system—a view formulated in the 
wake of Barzel’s model of the timing innovation. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977); see also 
Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 349-51 
(1968). However, these models do not fit the inherent uncertainty tied to innovation, 
as both of these papers use as a starting point a known innovation that only needs to 
be executed, rather than the uncertain discovery process of research and 
development that is needed to find what is possible. See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S 
ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 133 (2000). 
 3. See Kitch, supra note 2, at 275-80. 
 4. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 6-8 (2008) (giving 
constructive criticism of how to compare patents to tangible property in a much 
broader argument than the points that I raise here). 
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I. AMORPHOUSNESS OF INNOVATION 
The first point where the analogy between real property and 
patents fails and misleads is in the nature of the underlying subject 
matter: land exists in a real and tangible form. From time to time, we 
may adjust how we look at it, say in terms of erosion of coastlines 
and riparian rights on the surface; the bundling or unbundling of 
mineral and other resource rights underneath the surface; or the 
bundling or unbundling of air rights above the land’s surface. In 
contrast, intellectual property covers ideas. These do not exist in any 
“real” form. There are no ready metes and bounds to which we can 
refer to delineate the scope or breadth of an idea and the associated 
patent that shall characterize it for purposes of defining property 
rights.5 The metes and bounds that are to encapsulate the idea that 
becomes the patent need to be found; and as the process of 
innovation is an ongoing one,6 so then is the difficulty of the 
delineation of these rights.  
What this means in practice is that even once a patent is 
granted, its scope is often not fully known or understood, or even 
knowable or understandable, when it comes to interpreting the 
impact on future ideas and finding the boundary to ideas that are yet 
to be thought or discovered. Indeed, frequently the very nature of 
innovation is “cumulative,” and so the potential and scope of 
individual ideas take shape only in the wake of further innovation.7 
For instance, some patents that were applied for and granted in the 
context of radio and telephony have later been asserted to cover e-
commerce on the Internet in ways that were unimaginable at the time 
of issuance.8 Thus, relying ultimately on patents that address the 
                                                 
 5. See id. at 54. 
 6. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127 (2004). 
 7. See, e.g., id. at 127-32. 
 8. Personal Audio, LLC is a nonpracticing entity that has been called a 
“‘patent troll.’” Daniel Nazer & Julie Samuels, EFF Files Challenge with Patent 
Office Against Troll’s Podcasting Patent, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 16, 
2013), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-files-challenge-patent-office-against-
trolls-podcasting-patent. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has filed an inter 
partes review with the USPTO concerning their patents on grounds of prior art. See 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., PETITION FOR INTER PARTES REVIEW OF U.S. PAT. NO. 
8,112,504 (filed Mar. 4, 2009) (issued Feb. 7, 2012), available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/10/16/_inter_partes_review_petition_of_us_pat._no._
8112504.pdf. In April 2014 the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the challenge. Elec. Frontier Found. v. Personal Audio, 
LLC, No. IPR2014-00070, 2014 WL 1604334, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2014). 
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production of personalized analogue cassette recordings, Personal 
Audio, LLC filed suits against Apple, CBS, NBC, and (notably) 
against the radio personality Adam Carolla, as well as others, 
claiming that defendants’ podcasts infringed upon their patents.9 I 
refer to this defining feature that patents must address as the 
amorphousness of innovation that goes unrecognized when 
comparing patents to real property.10 
The problem that commercially relevant ideas can be 
amorphous is reflected in the fact that the purpose and effect of 
patents differ from one case to the next. Economists often like to 
differentiate between process and product innovations—the former 
improving on how something is produced or delivered in existing 
marketplaces, the latter referring to the opening up of new (product) 
markets. While this is frequently a useful taxonomy in modeling 
innovation and markets, it obscures how many innovations actually 
fall in between these two classifications with the boundaries between 
cumulative/sequential/incremental innovation and 
displacing/modular/paradigm-shifting being blurred—or amorphous. 
Yet, even when we have more clear delineations, economic impact 
frequently will carry across markets. Another frequently encountered 
method for distinguishing innovation is to look at the stages of 
innovation and then differentiate between foundational discoveries 
and marketable products;11 where in an ideal world, the former might 
be granted broad protection of limited duration in order to recoup 
investments that are not forthcoming of direct commercialization 
while not impeding further-flung innovations over time, and the 
latter might be afforded narrow scopes, as the commercial value is 
tied closely to the product that the patent applies to. However, here 
too, we suffer from the natural human desire to see linear narratives 
of creation, when in fact innovation is far from linear and actually a 
rather confused and chaotic process. 
                                                 
 9. See Nazer & Samuels, supra note 8; ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra 
note 8, at 1-2. 
 10. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 46 (comparing patents with 
tangible property, Bessen and Meurer succinctly put this as “[i]f you can’t tell the 
boundaries, [then] it ain’t property” (capitalization omitted)). 
 11. On the importance of this distinction and how it affects development 
with potentially overlapping patents, see Thomas D. Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, 
Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Product Development and Commercialization, 
14 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON. 27, 27-32 (2014), who argue that patent pools are rare 
in biotechnology in contrast to electronics, because many patents in biotech cover 
foundational discoveries and pooling would impede further innovation incentives. 
See SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 146-52. 
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Apart from trying to classify these real, but hard-to-identify, 
differences in types of innovation, it must also be recognized that the 
guise of ideas varies from subject matter to subject matter. Thus, 
chemical compounds may be well enough defined to find an easy 
delineation of what might be regarded as being covered by a patent 
that is applied to it. But frequently, the commercial viability is not 
tied to the compound itself but is rather tied to certain properties of 
the compound that may be replicated in what might be called 
substantially similar compounds—raising issues that are extensively 
discussed in intellectual property in the context of copyright 
protection. Of course, the issues of what the extent of a patent is, 
how far it extends, and what all is covered by it, become more 
difficult once the underlying subject matter becomes more diffuse: 
processes of making things, business methods, software, financial 
instruments, etc. This, then, quickly raises the additional question of 
what type of subject matter can be patented at all: things found in 
nature, mathematical formulae, stock and commodity indices, etc.?12 
The problem also comes to the fore when considering advances that 
are characterized by implicit or tacit knowledge that is inherently 
hard to codify, but frequently critical to obtain; for instance, in the 
important area of biotechnology.13 While limits as to what can be 
patented and what the permissible scope may have been recognized 
and enforced, there is nonetheless “mission creep” and ratcheting of 
boundaries observed in United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) practice,14 as the very impossibility of a one-size-fits-all 
patent institution lends itself to error on the side of inclusion. 
This all might not be an insurmountable problem if it were only 
a matter of finding (and maybe periodically revisiting) which ideas 
and how ideas should be patented. But the amorphousness of 
innovation raises the practical implication that even when a patent is 
issued there may be considerable doubt as to its actual scope and 
possibly even its validity. Thus, Lemley and Shapiro speak of 
                                                 
 12. Intellectual property governed by copyright protection generally stems 
from federal statutes; whereas for patents, Congress generally remains passive and 
the USPTO and the courts determine what subject matters fall under patent 
protection. See Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and 
Biotechnology, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 113, 113 (Eric A. 
Posner ed., 2000). 
 13. See, e.g., Thomas D. Jeitschko & Nanyun Zhang, On the Challenges 
Facing Patent Pooling in Biotechnology, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 113, 118 (2014). 
 14. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 34-35 (2004). 
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“probabilistic patents” to capture the inherent uncertainty tied to the 
status of a given patent and how it should affect the conduct of others 
in the marketplace.15 Indeed, along this view, one may go so far as to 
say that a patent, rather than being a well-defined right of definite 
scope, is merely an instrument that gives the owner standing in a 
court of law in which the validity (presumed, but not affirmed) and 
scope can be ascertained. This has two important implications when 
it comes to determining the role of patents in channeling economic 
activity. The first is immediate: since economic activity, that is, 
innovation and competition, is directly affected by the allocation and 
boundaries of property rights, the process of competition and 
innovation is undertaken “in the shadow of the law”16 and, hence, 
takes on an air of uncertainty.17 What makes this even worse when 
compared to real property is that litigating one patent generally does 
not generate that much information applicable to other patents; 
whereas litigating the boundaries of real estate tells you not only 
where one property ends, but also where the next begins.18 
The second important implication of “probabilistic patents” is 
derivative to the first.19 If it is ultimately the courts that lay out the 
existence and boundaries of (intellectual) property rights in 
piecemeal fashion,20 then litigation becomes an integral part of the 
toolkit of economic rivals in the marketplace. And, thus, what is 
intended to be a legal institution that secures ownership entitlements 
to foster innovation has, in many instances, morphed into a weapon 
used to thwart the very innovation it was intended to protect, as new 
                                                 
 15. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 75, 76 (2005). 
 16. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979). 
 17. Amazon.com’s suit against Barnes & Noble’s express lane check-out 
option at bn.com could have led to clarity as to whether Amazon’s patent covering 
their 1-click checkout would have been upheld. The fact that the case was ultimately 
settled leaves the issue somewhat unresolved, although the preliminary injunction 
against Barnes & Noble was lifted on grounds that the patent would possibly have 
been found invalid. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 74-75. In any event, since 
Apple has been paying a royalty for 1-click checkout in their iTunes store, there is a 
presumption now in the marketplace that the patent is valid. In contrast, Amazon’s 
1-click patent application has been rejected in Europe. Tim Worstall, Amazon Loses 
1-Click Patent, FORBES (July 7, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2011/07/07/amazon-loses-1-click-patent/. 
 18. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 54-55. 
 19. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 76. 
 20. See Dam, supra note 12, at 113. 
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ideas are open to the potential charge of being transgressions on 
existing, but yet-to-be-fully-characterized, rights. 
II. DYNAMISM OF INNOVATION 
The second shortcoming of the patent-as-real-property analogy 
is tied to the first point, concerning the importance of distinguishing 
between the nature of real property and intellectual property. 
However, it also goes beyond that and it concerns how we endeavor 
to achieve efficiency in society from an allocative standpoint. In 
economic terms, allocative efficiency is achieved when a society 
finds a point on the Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF)—
designating the loci of all possible combinations of goods and 
services that can be produced in a society with a given set of 
resources (including knowledge) without wasting any of those 
resources.21 When property rights are well defined and transaction 
costs are sufficiently low, we know from the Coase Theorem that an 
efficient allocation is attained through decentralized trade, even 
when there are externalities present.22 That is, with well-defined 
property rights and low transaction costs, societies achieve an 
allocation on the PPF.  
The notion of achieving a point on the PPF, however, is a static 
concept—it deals with what can be attained, for a given set of 
resources.23 And this is important for our discussion: When it comes 
to the efficient use of real property, so long as property rights are 
well defined and the transfer of title into the hands that value it most 
is not too costly, one will achieve allocative efficiency. But apart 
                                                 
 21. The question of where on the PPF a society finds itself is then tied to 
the question of distribution, rather than allocation. WALTER NICHOLSON & 
CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 4-5 
(12th ed. 2015).  
 22. The Coase Theorem as such is not actually directly found in Coase’s 
writings. He develops a considerable amount of insight on the role of transaction 
costs in economics in his seminal article The Nature of the Firm, see R.H. Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 396-97 (1937); and in his subsequent 
path breaking work on social costs, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-6 (1960), he essentially notes the main insights of what is known 
as the Coase Theorem, but Coase himself attributes the name to Stigler, who wanted 
to honor Coase. See The Univ. of Chi., Ronald H. Coase: On Economics, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04zFygmeCUA. Coase himself 
actually had some trouble in how the Theorem is often cited, in that for Coase the 
critical insight is that in the real world we are faced with considerable transaction 
costs. Id.  
 23. NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 21, at 4-5.  
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from the aforementioned problem of amorphousness of innovation, 
the other fundamental difference between real property (land) and 
intellectual property is that the former is limited and is therefore part 
of the “given set of resources” that must be efficiently used to attain 
the PPF,24 whereas much (virtually all) of the potential of the latter is 
yet to be unlocked.25 As a consequence, the two (real property and 
intellectual property) play a completely different role in achieving 
efficiency in society. The static recognition of the PPF does not 
account for the potential that is to be unlocked by protecting the 
ongoing process of innovation through ideas. Indeed, the nature of 
the patent—a grant of a temporary monopoly—speaks precisely to 
the trade-off we are willing to accept in recognition of the difference 
between a given limited resource, such as land, and the promise of 
potentially limitless resources, such as human inventiveness, 
creativity, and imagination. By granting a patent qua monopoly, we 
allow for current allocations below the PPF that are ex definitione 
inefficient,26 precisely because the granting of patents protects the 
incentives that allow the PPF to expand and grow, yielding new 
allocation possibilities that are otherwise unattainable. Thus, the 
importance of property being well defined for given real resources is 
in order to achieve an allocation on the PPF; whereas, the importance 
of defining property for intellectual achievement is not to be on the 
PPF, but to expand the PPF. I refer to this important feature that 
patents must cover as the aspect of dynamism of innovation that is 
overlooked when comparing patents to real property. 
The importance of recognizing the connection between change 
and growth can hardly be overstated, as we are in the midst of 
changes brought about as new-economy companies in the 
information economy find ways to generate, aggregate, replicate, 
                                                 
 24. See id. 
 25. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 127. 
 26. It should be noted that just because a monopoly is granted to the 
inventor this does not imply an inefficient allocation of resources necessarily. See 
NICHOLSON & SNYDER, supra note 21, at 356. Market power distorts allocations and 
generally also then creates inefficiencies—deadweight loss. But as the example of 
perfect (first-degree) price discrimination (or perfect two-tier pricing) illustrates, 
allocative efficiency can be obtained in the presence of monopoly, as these 
particular pricing schemes convert all consumer surplus and all deadweight loss into 
profit. Id. at 355-56; Thomas D. Jeitschko, Issues in Price Discrimination: A 
Comment on and Addendum to “Teaching Price Discrimination,” by Caroll and 
Coates, 68 S. ECON. J. 178, 184 (2001). 
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protect, disseminate, and ultimately monetize information.27 This, in 
itself, has ready implications for how the codification of intellectual 
property affects a large swath of economic activity in modern 
economies. However, there are three additional intertwined 
developments that are tied to the issues of amorphousness discussed 
above. 
First, the catalogue of patentable subject matter grows over 
time as new notions of what should be patentable are added to the 
catalogue in response to changing market and business models, while 
existing subject matter is not discarded, especially as new methods 
are found to monetize existing patent forms beyond what originally 
served as the rationale for allowing patentability.28 Thus, there is a 
ratchet in place that increases the scope of patentable subject 
matter.29 
Second, as underlying ideas are amorphous and the views and 
interpretation of ideas shift over time, the boundaries of the patents 
themselves are inevitably amorphous.30 As more ideas enter the 
collection of material that is patented, patents inevitably begin to 
conflict and overlap, possibly creating blocking constellations that 
hinder applications of the knowledge embodied in the patents, 
resulting in a phenomenon referred to as the patent thicket: “a dense 
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must 
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology.”31  
Lastly, over the last few years, the number of claims per patent 
and the sheer number of patents newly issued has increased 
                                                 
 27. The Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) sector 
accounts for nearly 4% of U.S. GDP but 40% of U.S. patents. See DONALD D. KIM, 
BRIAN M. LINDENBERG & JUSTIN M. MONALDO, ANNUAL INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS: 
ADVANCE STATISTICS ON GDP BY INDUSTRY FOR 2008, at 28 (2009), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2009/05%20May/0509_indyaccts.pdf; NAT’L SCI. BD., 
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012, at 6-51 (2012), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/c06.pdf.  
 28. See Dam, supra note 12, at 118-20. 
 29. See id. at 118-19. On a related note, many have also seen an expansion 
of the spheres that patents cover, especially in the wake of the Madey v. Duke 
University case that curtailed the experimental use exception that many researchers 
had claimed for non-commercial purposes. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 30. See Dam, supra note 12, at 123. 
 31. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 
(Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001). 
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dramatically.32 Thus, between 1997 and 2013 the number of total 
patent grants has more than doubled from under 125,000 to over 
300,000, with an increase of over 25,000 just in the final year.33 In 
the context of biotechnology, this has been coined a “patent 
tsunami,”34 but the term may well apply more broadly. This 
explosive growth is in part a reflection of the tremendous growth in 
the importance and volume of knowledge that plays a role in the 
marketplace. But it is also a response to how patent policy and 
practice have evolved of late. Thus, thresholds imposed by the 
admittedly under-staffed USPTO are generally deemed in practice to 
be too low.35 Moreover, with patents underdefined and firms 
competing and innovating in the shadow of the courts where actual 
litigation or the threat of litigation has become a strategic tool among 
rivals in the marketplace, firms have every incentive to amass patents 
both for possible offensive and defensive purposes. As a result, many 
firms now patent innovations that beforehand would have been let go 
into the public domain.36 
 
                                                 
 32. Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar 
Years 1963-2013, USPTO (July 24, 2014, 6:22 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Jacques Warcoin, ‘Patent Tsunami’ in the Field of Genetic Diagnostics: 
A Patent Practitioner’s View, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING 
MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS, AND LIABILITY 
REGIMES 331, 331 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) (citing Kyle Jensen & Fiona 
Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 
239 (2005)).  
 35. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 131. 
 36. See id. at 13-15. 
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These trends feed off each other—expanding the subject matter 
that is patentable causes an increase in overlapping claims and 
furthers the importance of patents as tools in threatened or actual 
litigation, which leads to an amassing of patent portfolios.38 Thus, for 
example, in 2012 over a quarter of a million active patents were 
specifically tied to the manufacture and sale of smartphones—that’s 
over a sixth of all active patents.39 Such numbers lead to serious 
concerns as to the degree to which patent policy and practice protect 
and foster innovation. Of course, there are institutional responses to 
these trends; thus, in many instances open-source is seen as a 
disarmament tactic that can also make individual economic sense if 
there are strong enough network and scale effects that allow people 
to pocket the savings from not having to deal with the patent system. 
Otherwise, cross licensing, standard setting, and patent pools are all 
institutions that potentially overcome the patent thicket problems, at 
least in some areas.40 In return, however, all these institutions then 
squarely place the participants into the realm of antitrust scrutiny—
                                                 
 37. See Patent Tech. Monitoring Team, supra note 32.  
 38. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 14, at 13-15, 56. 
 39. Daniel O’Connor, One in Six Active U.S. Patents Pertain to the 
Smartphone, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Oct. 17, 2012), http://project-
disco.org/intellectual-property/one-in-six-active-u-s-patents-pertain-to-the-
smartphone/ (citing DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 27 (2009)).  
 40. See Shapiro, supra note 31, at 144. 
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an area that still needs to be further developed in light of the 
problems faced by firms.41 
III. OUTLOOK 
The problems surrounding the proper role of patenting in 
protecting and fostering innovation are currently under debate in 
policy circles—foremost so in the context of the supposition that so-
called patent assertion entities (PAEs) have exploited the weaknesses 
of the current system in order to hold up other market participants.42 
Thus, both the White House and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) have become active in the policy debates and the FTC in 
undergoing studies and litigation concerning PAEs.43 Courts have 
also begun taking a responsive, rather than a dogmatic, approach.44  
In addition to the political and legal discussions surrounding 
standard-setting entities and fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) licensing, courts have also placed a wedge between 
patents and the traditional model of property. Thus, since the eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 2006 ruling,45 affirmed in the Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 2008 Supreme Court 
ruling, injunctive relief is no longer the default for transgressions 
against patent holders.46 This is an important shift, as it directly 
affects how patents might be used in litigation. However, the case 
law in the area is actively evolving, as evidenced in the recent Trebro 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Firefly Equipment, LLC case in which 
injunctive relief was upheld despite the patent holder not using the 
infringed patent.47 The decision hinged upon the fact that the two 
firms were direct competitors in the marketplace, with the infringing 
                                                 
 41. See id. 
 42. Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet - Executive Actions: Answering 
the President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, WHITE 
HOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-
strengthen-our-p; Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) Study, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2015); see also MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, Jay Mac Rust, and 
Farney Daniels, P.C.; Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 67,435, 67,436 
(proposed Nov. 13, 2014) (containing the consent decree between FTC and MPHJ 
Technology Investments). 
 43. See supra note 42. 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
 45. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 46. 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
 47. 748 F.3d 1159, 1171-72 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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firm using the intellectual property to compete against the patent 
holder.48 
The 2013 U.S. Supreme Court case over the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, in which it was ruled that while surrounding know-
how is patentable, genes themselves are not, suggests that courts are 
weary of the ever-expanding subject matter of patents.49 And 
similarly, there are movements to increase the threshold for the 
granting of patents in areas in which patentability itself is 
undisputed; e.g., in In re Kubin, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that “obvious to try” is a proper and sufficient basis to 
determine whether an idea was obvious or not.50 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, patent law, patent policy, and patent practice are and 
have been undergoing changes. With a nod to Coase,51 one might say 
that much of the evolution has been associated with trying to get 
property rights “well defined” in this inherently amorphous and 
dynamic space. It appears that many of these efforts have been 
counterproductive, whereas others have helped clarify matters and 
maybe pushed the discussion into the realm of competition and 
antitrust policy, and away from property rights.52 For some, these 
changes are not pushing us in the right direction, and they conclude 
that the right path is to abolish the patent system altogether.53  
However, again with a nod to Coase,54 it is worth noting that in the 
quest to define the system of rights, it might be best to directly target 
the level of transaction costs associated with establishing and 
transferring these rights. Reforms in these areas could lead to a 
tightening of the delineation of boundaries at the stage of granting 
patents with overall much higher barriers, rather than de facto 
deferring to courts in many instances. It can be helpful to allow for 
free use of intellectual property in cases in which patent holders are 
                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2120 (2013). 
 50. 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 51. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 52. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50. 
 53. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY 243 (2008). 
 54. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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suffering no more than minor damages and transgressors are not 
reaping large gains that could not be otherwise obtained but for the 
transgression. And, finally, to use an analogy from real property that 
would be valuable to have in place, it would substantially lower 
transaction costs if patent holdership were centrally registered with a 
USPTO clerk,55 just as the transfer of real property requires a deed 
being recorded with the county clerk.56 
                                                 
 55. Currently, the USPTO tracks assignments that are submitted 
voluntarily, but they simply make this data available without checking for reliability 
or veracity. See Assignment Search, USPTO, http://assignment.uspto.gov/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). In the words of the USPTO: “Recordation is a ministerial 
function—the USPTO neither makes a determination of the legality of the 
transaction nor the right of the submitting party to take the action.” Id. 
 56. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 54-55. 
